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Introduction 
 
Let us start with a quick observation. The literature on land use, spatial and urban planning tends to 
feature phrases such as “… the urban system changed towards the postmodern city…” or “… the city 
aimed for a growth strategy…” as short-hand for what is essentially a very complex interaction 
between actors trying to achieve their goals, often contradictory, and the characteristics of the 
physical system or built environment. In many ways, this interaction is still something of a black box 
in the science of urban planning. This is at least partly due to the fact that it is simply hard to analyze 
that interaction, but also partly due to the fact that we as have locked ourselves up in the tightly-
defined disciplinary containers where we have been trained in understanding our own topic in such a 
way that we don’t understand it in any other way. This helps our deeper understanding of one 
particular aspect but in doing so we (inadvertently) forget to look at the complex interaction 
mentioned above.   
The goal of this short working paper is to open that black box (at least a bit) and see how human 
agency coevolves with the physical system or built environment in shaping specific trajectories over 
time. In doing so, I will use a range of concepts and methods from the literature about complex 
systems. I would like to focus on the narrative and main argument and I will emit the more technical 
details. There are quite a few good books and papers on these topics so there is little use in repeating 
that all here. In fact, this paper also serves as a pointer to that literature.  
As mentioned above, I would like to start my argument with the statement that urban planning and 
the urban or regional or physical systems are intertwined. Planning decisions lead to physical and 
social changes if they are implemented, while physical and social changes in return demand 
planning efforts. Demographic changes are a convenient example here. Over time, this interaction 
starts shaping specific trajectories of the urban or regional system. They evolve in certain ways, 
sometimes slow, sometimes quicker. This general argument has been furthered by among others 
Norgaard (Gual & Norgaard, 2010; Kallis & Norgaard, 2010; Norgaard, 1984b, 1994c, 1995a) and in 
the realm of urban and transport planning in my own work (Gerrits, 2008, 2011). In starting this 
argument, we should keep the following points in mind:  
 
 Any planning decision builds on an existing situation, there is no such thing as a greenfield 
situation. Even those places that are not yet earmarked or locked in planning regimes, that appear 
greenfield, is still a place that has certain characteristics. The idea that there can be tabula rasa is 
a figment of imagination. 
 Human agency, that is: our ability to do certain things (or not!), and our considerations leading 
us to do certain things (or not!) are very important in those trajectories. Nature is essentially 
indifferent. It is us, people, that can influence the course of nature. We do that as planners, but 
also as consumers, as citizens, as users etc. It is useful to remember Portugali’s statement that in 
the city as well as outside of it, everyone is a planner (Portugali, 1997).  
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 In making decisions, which means anything ranging from ‘real’ planning decisions made by 
planning authorities to the daily use of the city and its surroundings, we shape the system and 
the urban system shapes us. Now how does that happen?  
 
 
Myopic, non-ergodic behavior  
 
The decisions I mentioned above are made at a particular point in time, in a particular place, by 
particular people. Urban and regional planning doesn’t’ ‘just happen’ from out of nowhere. There 
are people at work and they do things (Fischer, 2003; Fischer & Forester, 1987, 1993). And in doing 
things – in the broadest sense of the world – they are shaping trajectories.  
If it is true that decisions made in a particular temporal and spatial context, it is also true that those 
decisions can be influenced by chance events: the occurrence of seemingly extra-ordinary 
circumstances (Arthur, 1994; Rescher, 1995, 1998). Being the humans that we are, we respond to 
those events. As such, it may very well be that that such events have an impact on the decision we 
made. Now, it wouldn’t be important or interesting if people could predict the outcomes of all 
decisions. Unfortunately, they don’t. People are myopic (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; David, 1985; 
March, 1991, 1994; Simon, 1991). They respond to what is here and now and the best they can 
achieve is trying to grasp the immediate future. Of course, you will now strongly object and tell me 
that many resources are spend on predictions. I agree. I just don’t think that they return future-proof 
results. Let me give you two examples of that.  
 
The Eurotunnel can serve as an example of a megaproject driven by erroneous predictions about 
future use, as Flyvbjerg and colleagues argued (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 
Skamris Holm, & Buhl, 2005). Once opened and in operation, the Eurotunnel attracted approximately 
half the number of passengers originally predicted. Why was that? There are a number of reasons. 
Flyvbjerg et al. focus on one the positive outlook that drove the prediction, which serves as a 
euphemism for what they consider industrial-grade lying. The tunnel had to be constructed so 
numbers were inflated. I’m afraid that I find their conclusions convincing. But we should also not 
overlook the fact that the predictions were made in a world that was quite different from the one in 
which the actual operation took place. The plans and the predictions upon which those plans were 
drafted, were made before the European skies were deregulated and before the arrival of low cost 
carriers. The Eurotunnel had a somewhat solid business case (though not very much so) in the world 
in which that business case had been made: a world without companies such as EasyJet and Ryanair 
that seized the opportunity of deregulation. By the time the tunnel was up and running, the business 
case was destroyed and Eurotunnel and Eurostar, the two main companies behind it, are still staging 
an uphill battle in order to get healthy financially. In fact, given how things are going, I believe that 
Eurotunnel will always struggle to stay fit.  
 
The second example concerns the planning of Makkasan site in Bangkok. In the 1950s and the 1960s, 
the authorities of Bangkok decided that the car was the future. Subsequently, they removed pretty 
much all of the rail-bound traffic and focused on motorways and cars as a driver for growth. The 
results were devastating and at some point in the 1980s, Bangkok could be considered as one of the 
most congested systems in the world. Getting railways back in the city was going to be very tough 
because of the financial constraints. In the early 2000s, it was decided that a public-private partnership 
construct would be the only way to move forward. Thus it was that the Airport Railway Link (ARL), the 
rail connection between the city center and the new airport, should be constructed and operated using 
a DBFMO-contract (Design, Build, Finance, Maintenance and Operate). The wining consortium would 
have to pay everything upfront but would be allowed to recoup the costs by developing the Makkasan 
site with a terminal building, hotels etc. However, the very act of building the ARL meant that other 
sites that were linked to it suddenly became very attractive. That drained all the potential for Makkasan 
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and the PPP folded subsequently. In other words, building the ARL set off a cascade of unforeseen 
effects that threatened the construction and operation to its core (Gerrits & Marks, 2017).  
 
These two examples demonstrate that we are simply not very good at predicting urban trajectories. I 
will not ignore Flybvbjerg’s argument that at least some of these erroneous predictions are made on 
purpose to further power and deceive opponents. That is part of the story indeed. But I also would 
like to add that people sometimes really believe that they are correct about the future, except that they 
aren’t. The example of the Airport Railway Link demonstrates that unforeseen futures are very 
possible and it can lead to unfavorable results. It is probably sheer coincidence if people get their 
long-term predictions right.  
The discussion about chance and lack of foresight takes me to another point that has relevance for 
our argument: non-ergodicity (David, 1985). Non-ergodicity means that the occurrence of chance, as 
responded to in our decisions concerning the built environment, don’t equal out in the long run. 
Quite the contrary: these events stay relevant throughout the trajectory; their effect won’t dis appear. 
Let me illustrate that with another example.   
 
In 1999, the Dutch Parliament had to review the budget for a range of large tunnel projects in the 
Netherlands as part of the construction of a dedicated freight railway line called Betuweroute. This 
moment of decision-making coincided with the Mont Blanc tunnel disaster in which lives were lost 
due to failing safety equipment and inefficient procedures for the emergency services. Of course, the 
disaster also shook the Dutch Members of Parliament. Consequently, when the decision moment 
arrived, the MP’s argued for a thorough revision of all the plans that were submitted in order to make 
sure that a Mont-Blanc type of disaster would not occur in the Netherlands. Here we notice how the 
particular circumstances at a given time and place have an important influence on the things being 
build or developed. The interesting thing, though, is that the effect of this chance event is lasting. The 
redesign of the tunnels as well as changes to the existing constructions were very costly and meant a 
set-back of the construction deadline (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003). Future effects include a much 
longer time needed to repay the construction costs, extended maintenance costs, as well as the costs 
associated with the training of emergency crew. In addition, this being decided in the Parliament and 
therefore becoming law, it had also had an effect on the tunnels build later in other projects such as 
the high-speed railway from Amsterdam to Brussels (Gerrits & Marks, 2014).  
 
So, in short, at any time and any place, any decision made in urban and regional planning carries the 
context of that particular decision with it. And that shapes the spatial trajectories over time. If that is 
true, and let’s assume that for the moment, it means that that complex systems (i.e. coupled socio-
physical systems) are sensitive to the particular and singular conditions that can resonate through the 
further evolution of the system. It also means that we have now introduced a degree of uncertainty, 
ever so slight, in the analysis and planning of such systems. While we get a rough idea of what the 
future will look like, this picture may be somewhat – or a lot – inaccurate. The examples mentioned 
above just demonstrated that. But as you will know by now, chance matters because its effects last.  
 
 
Path-dependency in trajectories 
 
The narrative so far may give the impression that trajectories are completely random but that is not 
the case, of course. In fact, the trajectories that start to emerge over a longer period of time can be 
quite stable, they feature a certain degree of path-dependency. We should remember the points 
mentioned in the introduction that any spatial plan, project or program builds on an existing physical 
and social situation that has considerable impact on what we can and cannot do. In other words: the 
existing situation determines our degrees of freedom or the options available to us in the space of 
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possibilities. In short, “[p]ath-dependency and lock-in refer to the idea that even very small 
unpredictable events may cause a system, by optimising at the local level, to get on a path that is 
practically impossible to leave. In other words, small (historical) micro-evolutionary changes cause a 
system to lock itself into a certain outcome based on continuous rational decisions made in the past; 
i.e. irreversible adaptation.” (Gerrits & Marks, 2008). Path-dependency is an important explanation in 
the general understanding or experience that it is actually quite difficult to change an existing 
situation. As an explanandum, it has made its way in the analysis of economic systems (Arthur, 1994; 
Arthur & Durlauf, 1997; David, 1985). It has also proven its relevance to other domains, such as 
political science (Pierson, 2000). For instance, we have used it to explain in what ways the geometry 
of the Zeeland delta in the Netherlands limited the options available to decision-makers when 
deciding about the future of the brackish water systems in the delta (Gerrits & Marks, 2008).  
 
Rotterdam, my hometown, can serve as a nice example of the mechanisms and effects of path-
dependency. For long, Rotterdam was a rather insignificant town, overshadowed by other towns with 
direct maritime access such as Dordrecht. This changed in the 19th century when the Nieuwe 
Waterweg was opened. It is man-made channel providing direct and convenient access to the North 
Sea, which promoted trade and turned Rotterdam in a true port city. The real boom came in the 1950s 
and 1960s when the post-war reconstruction of Europe meant a considerable influx of materials as well 
as outflow of migrants to the new world. The port expanded rapidly and so did its workforce. By the 
1980s, it had become the world’s largest port and an economic powerhouse for the Netherlands. But it 
didn’t just stay that way forever.   
The first major change was the introduction of the shipping container and other innovations aimed at 
bringing the costs down. The container in particular meant that one didn’t need a considerable 
workforce to load or unload cargo. The result was massive unemployment. The second change was the 
disappearance of traditional industries such shipbuilding because there were other places in the world 
where that could be done at a much cheaper price. Of course, deindustrialization was a much broader 
development that has hit about every place in Europe. But it was particularly fierce in cities and 
regions that were fully reliant on heavy industries such as Rotterdam, or Coventry or the entire Rhine-
Ruhr Area. 
So Rotterdam, as many of these other places, became post-industrial. Or did it? Well, not quite. 
Despite these massive changes, the city is still a traditional port city except now that very few people 
actually work there due to automation and other efficiency gains. We have all been told that the future 
is in green energy and ICT and other innovations. So why is it didn’t the decision-makers move in that 
direction when they saw the writing on the wall? Simply, because the costs of changing right now 
(monetary but also expressed in other aspects) are much higher than the immediate returns of 
changing the trajectory, even though the alternative trajectory will probably deliver higher returns in 
the long run. So we can observe in Rotterdam that, despite all good intentions from planners and 
stakeholders alike, most of the decisions are made with the express purpose of reinforcing the current 
situation. For example, the main thrust is to extent the port and to make transfer of goods even more 
efficient than it already is – even though most of the profits now go to foreign companies that have 
bought many of the Dutch companies operating in the port. Another example was the decision to 
reinforce the fossil-fuel industry, e.g. by building new coal-fired power plants in addition to existing 
ones. Naturally, a few windmills have been placed but one can’t escape the feeling that it is all rather 
limited. And in the city itself, we can observe how the population itself – while more ethnically more 
diverse than before – is still as (relatively) poor and uneducated as in the 1960s. The city also suffers 
from the Red Queen effect (Sementelli, 2007): even if things are changing, other cities are changing 
faster.  
 
In short: path-dependency is real. And while the example above pointed at the negative 
consequences, it can also be beneficial. For example, engineering firms and other companies dealing 
with technology, as well as research institutes in Bavaria, have benefited from path-dependency. In 
many ways, it is much easier for them to remain the go-to shop for innovative technologies than it 
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will be for other regions to get in that niche. This effect has been observed elsewhere, too (Boschma, 
Minondo, & Navarro, 2011; Neffke, Henning, & Boschma, 2011).  
 
 
Punctuated equilibrium and hysteresis 
 
Now, path-dependency also doesn’t mean that everything stays the same forever. On the contrary, 
things can change and can change quickly due to geographical or physical changes, but above all due 
to changes in frames and beliefs of human actors. That takes us back to human agency. We are here 
in Switzerland where it has been only two centuries or so that mankind has come to view the Alps as 
something attractive rather than something that should be feared (Schueler, 2008). That mindset has 
changed tremendously and the Alps are now a prominent driver of tourism. And you make decisions 
because of that changed mindset. Access roads have been made, hotels have been constructed, cable 
cars give access to the highest peaks, parks have been designated for nature and recreation, and ski 
slopes have been cleared. In short, we have made many changes to the landscape and our settlements 
because of that changed mindset. 
Trajectories are therefore neither completely random, nor completely static. They feature a 
punctuated nature, where periods of stasis can be interrupted by periods of quick changes. Just to 
make clear: when we talk about punctuated equilibrium, we talk about a specific kind of change 
where build of pressure on the system doesn’t lead to an equally gradual change within the system 
(Baumgartner, 1993; Eldredge & Gould, 1972; Gersich, 1991). In fact, the pressure can mount for 
quite a while without any discernible change because many systems have buffers that can 
accommodate those pressures. This is often referred to as resilience or robustness (unfortunately, 
much of the literature uses these terms interchangeably). However, once that pressure has reached a 
certain threshold, the system will topple in a new equilibrium.   
These changes, in turn, show an important but not well-understood effect: the hysteresis effect. 
Hysteresis explains “that a transition from one state to the other does not imply that the reverse can 
occur.” (Graham & Seltzer, 1979). A short explanation is as follows: “Suppose that a system at time t0 
is put under continuous pressure p. Each system has some capacity to absorb these pressures 
without needing to change its structures and processes This pressure can increase for a considerable 
period of time t1-n where a constant amount of pressure (1p) is added at each point in time (1-n). A 
sudden transition of the system state occurs at tn+1 at which point it shifts to a new equilibrium. 
Although it appears that increasing the level of pressure by a single unit (1p) caused the system to 
move to the critical threshold, this is not the case. Instead, the shift was the result of the accumulated 
pressure during the period before the threshold was reached. While one may argue that system 
transitions could be undone by reversing the last 1p, the hysteresis effect implies that the point at 
which a system loses its resilience and becomes vulnerable to the pressures that could push it into a 
new state lies much before the actual tipping point.” (Gerrits, 2012). And that is why one is allowed 
to laugh when people talk about “going back to how it was”. There is no such thing as returning to 
the past – not in philosophical terms, not in material terms. Let’s add another example to our 
argument.  
 
The port of Hamburg is situated more than a 100 kilometers away from the sea, at the point where the 
Elbe River changes into the Unterelbe estuary. This is considered a problem by the decision-makers. 
The Unterelbe is relatively shallow so big ships need to ride the tidal way over the estuary in order to 
reach the port without problems. Over the past decades, the port authorities have undertaken regular 
deepening operations in which layers of sediments were removed from the estuary, thus ensuring that 
shipping could still take place even though the trend in ship building is towards bigger ships 
extending deeper in the water.  
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Until recently, the deepening operations did not lead to any negative consequences for the natural 
system. That changed dramatically after the deepening of the mid-1990s. That particular operation 
removed a layer – inadvertently, I should add – that was pivotal in keeping the inflow of salt water 
from the North Sea in check. When that layer was removed, the estuary turned into a flood-dominant 
system where more sediments were transported from the sea into the port than fresh water from the 
Elbe River could flush out. In short, the operation aimed at a deeper port lead to a port where more, 
instead of fewer, sediments started to accumulate – subsequently making the port shallower. The 
authorities responded to this with extra dredging operations – there is always a solution to everything – 
but one could argue that the operation had crossed its own motive. Interestingly, it was widely 
recognized that putting the last layer that was removed back in place was going to be extremely 
difficult and it was very uncertain that it would solve the problem (Gerrits, 2010).  
 
So, here we have it. We see the punctuated equilibrium in the fact that multiple deepening 
operations over a number of decades didn’t lead to a gradual change to a flood-dominant estuary. The 
system only changed after the last deepening but the change was the aggregate result of all the 
deepening operations that took place. We can then see the hysteresis effect in the assessment that the 
operation can’t be ‘undone’ by putting back a layer of sediments. The physical system has reached a 
new equilibrium where the inflow is dominant and the decision-makers have to deal with this new 
reality.  
 
 
Equifinality and multifinality 
 
We have now discussed some of the main properties of trajectories. As the final step in this paper, I 
would like to talk about equifinality and multifinality. Equifinality means that under different 
conditions, trajectories can tend towards a similar state, the so-called equifinality point. Multifinality 
means that similar conditions can be bring forth similar outcomes. I can’t overstate the importance 
of these points because we are so often fooled in believing that, because two trajectories look the 
same, they will have emerged from the same conditions; or, conversely, that two dissimilar 
trajectories are brought forth under dissimilar conditions. This constitutes an enormous analytical 
error. As shown elsewhere (Gerrits & Verweij, 2013a, 2013b, 2016; Verweij, 2015), equifinality and 
multifinality are real in urban planning and we should not be let by our love for symmetry to think 
that the trajectories obey to that longing.  
The subtle but important difference is between ‘same’ and ‘similar’. We often treat things that are 
similar as same and are therefore lead to believe that the same conditions have occurred. The minor 
differences within these conditions can easily disappear, simply because most analytical work 
requires abstraction to work. But as e.g. Cilliers has argued, any model that wishes to fully represent 
a complex system will have to be as extended and detailed as the target system (Cilliers, 2001, 2002). 
Since this is practically impossible, we simplify. But in doing so, we remove some of the unique 
properties that are inherent to complex systems and so deny us the chance to understand the 
equifinal and multifinal nature of trajectories (see Gerrits & Verweij, 2013; for an extended argument 
about why this matters for a thorough analysis of complex systems). You know the saying that the 
devil is in the detail? It is.  
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Figure 1: graphical representation of the argument in this paper 
 
 
I’ve summarized the argument in the rather crude picture shown above (figure 1). It represents a 
trajectory – not an actual one, I should hasten to add – to show that we are dealing with systems can 
sometimes change, and sometimes not. They have turning points in the shape of punctuated 
equilibrium as well as continuities in the shape of path-dependency. We as researchers are tasked 
with understanding the nature of those changes and continuities. In doing that, we shouldn’t just 
hoover at great distance from the evolutionary trajectories of these systems. We need to get into the 
nitty-gritty details of human agency in these the trajectories to understand how that agency is both 
shaping and driving those trajectories.  
Note that I left the y-axis blank or at least gave it a very general description, namely problem and 
solution continuum. This is because I don’t want to impose any format. You as a researcher will have 
to decide yourself what variables you will want to focus on. I myself find it really interesting to look at 
the problem and solution space, i.e. what is considered the problem with the current system 
concerning a certain issue, and how the solution space is explored and decided upon (cf. Gerrits & 
Marks, 2017). But you can select other dimensions, of course.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The main take-away from this paper is a simple one: there is a real need to understand urban 
trajectories as the coevolution between human actors and the built or physical environment in their 
full richness. This requires us to analyze the turning points and the conditions of these turning 
points, i.e. the exact circumstances under which changes were achieved. Naturally, such an analysis 
needs to be comparative as well as longitudinal. I would like to stress the need for empirical research 
because modeling (an all-time favorite in urban planning research) is useful but not if we forget to 
bridge the (rather large) gap with the real world. In the words of David Byrne, the previous speaker: 
we need to engage with down and dirty empiricism (Byrne, 2001, 2002).  
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